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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
"This case is for the birds: migratory birds, protected by
the MBTA"
-Judge Easterbrook,
United States v. Van Fossan,
899 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1990)
This case is for the birds, seeking to find the scope of pro-
tection afforded to migratory birds under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA) of 1918. The United States Forest Ser-
vice (Forest Service) and Blackacre Forest Products (Black-
acre) are appealing the United States District Court for the
District of New Union's decision in which the court held the
issue ripe for review, holding in favor of Citizens to Save the
Birds (CSB), finding that the Forest Service was bound to act
in accordance with the MBTA and that the MBTA's misde-
meanor provision is one of strict liability. Accordingly, the
court found that migratory bird deaths would result from the
clearcutting of the Big Tree Tract, in violation of the MBTA.
This appeal highlights four legal issues concerning
whether timber harvesting can be prevented in order to pro-
tect migratory birds from being killed. First, whether the cit-
izen's group, CSB, has standing to bring these issues.
1998] 793
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Second, whether the MBTA's misdemeanor provision is a
strict liability offense. Third, whether the MBTA can prevent
clearcutting. And finally, whether the MBTA is "law" for the
purposes of APA review. All four of these issues are discussed
in this memorandum, with both sides of the argument
presented, as well as sample questions that may be used to
question participants on their knowledge of the issues.
The MBTA was enacted in 1918, to implement a conven-
tion between the United States and Great Britain which ad-
dressed the massive number of migratory bird deaths
occurring from recreational hunting and market hunting.
The MBTA has since been amended to implement conven-
tions that the United States has signed with Mexico, Japan,
and the Soviet Union. The MBTA makes all hunting of mi-
gratory birds unlawful unless the hunting is authorized by
regulations adopted pursuant to the MBTA. Section 703 of
the MBTA provides that:
it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any
manner, to pursue, hunt, take capture, kill, attempt to
take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell . . . any
migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird...
However, under the MBTA, the Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to determine under what circumstances the hunt-
ing of migratory birds is permissible; therefore, the MBTA is
not a blanket prohibition against killing migratory birds, it
simply prohibits killing migratory birds in an unauthorized
manner. For example, the Department of the Interior has
promulgated regulations allowing hunters to kill migratory
birds, as long as the hunters do no hunt over baited fields, or
not within authorized hunting seasons.
The instant case arises because many migratory birds
have made their homes in the United States' national forests
that are harvested for timber. The United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (Forest Service) is the agency responsible for
administration of the national forests; its actions are gov-
erned under the National Forest Management Act (NFMA).
Historically, forest management began with two broad goals:
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to protect favorable water flows and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber. Today, the goal of forest management has
broadened, seeking to balance the multiple uses of our na-
tional forests, such as tree harvesting and wild life conserva-
tion. The issues presented in the instance case highlight the
difficulty in finding this balance: protecting migratory birds
and at the same time, allowing timber harvesting that will
disrupt birds' habitats.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sets forth the
applicable scope of review for administrative decisions, re-
quiring a reviewing court to set aside agency action that is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law. An agency's actions, such as the For-
est Service's actions, can only fail to be "in accordance with
law" when the agency's actions are subject to that law. Here,
the issue is whether the Forest Service's actions are subject
to the MBTA. If the Forest Service's actions are, the Forest
Service may have violated the MBTA; if not, the Forest Ser-
vice cannot have violated the MBTA.
Suggested Questions for Judges
Sample Questions on Standing and Ripeness Issues
Is CSB's claimed injury directly traceable to the actions of the
Forest Service?
Is there a substantial likelihood that the court can provide
relief that would redress the alleged injury?
The Supreme Court has interpreted the standing doctrine at
times stringently, while at other times generously granting
standing. Where is the Supreme Court on the standing doc-
trine today?
How can the injury be characterized: concrete, particular-
ized, or merely hypothetical?
How can this issue be considered ripe for judicial review
when Blackacre has not engaged in any clearcutting?
Section 10(a) of the APA requires that "a person suffering a
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the rele-
1998] 795
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vant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof," only if the
agency action is final. Is CSB challenging a final agency
action?
What is the "zone of interest" test, and can CSB show that it
was intended to be protected by the MBTA?
Sample Questions on the Strict Liability Issue
Is the absence of a mens rea requirement conclusive that the
misdemeanor provision is a strict liability offense?
Are there any cases in which the court has interpreted a stat-
ute that is silent on mens reas to require scienter?
Did Congress clearly intend the MBTA's misdemeanor provi-
sion to be a strictly liable offense?
How can one argue that the misdemeanor provision is not a
strict liability offense when the judicial precedent over-
whelmingly interprets the MBTA misdemeanor provision as
a strict liability provision?
Many courts interpreting the MBTA's misdemeanor provision
as a strict liability provision have noted that absurd results
occur; do these results raise any due process concerns?
Is there any trend by the Supreme Court in interpreting
strict liability criminal statutes?
Is the MBTA a public welfare statute? If it is, would the
Supreme Court interpret this public welfare statute as a
strict liability statue?
What interpretation of the MBTA's misdemeanor provision
best serves the purposes for which the statute was enacted?
Sample Questions on the Timber Harvesting Issue
Does the legislative history support using the MBTA to pre-
vent the extinction of birds, or is the MBTA simply a bird
hunting statute?
Is there any language in any of the treaties which recognizes
or advocates bird habitat protection?
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Does the broad language of the MBTA support judicial inter-
pretation that it is a general bird protection statute, protect-
ing birds, regardless of the activities that cause harm?
Have courts accepted a broad reading of the MBTA to include
protecting birds from deaths other than from hunting?
How can it be reconciled that, for the first time in eighty
years, the MBTA should be interpreted as prohibiting timber
harvesting, when it is an activity supported by Congress, as
seen by the passage of forest management legislation and by
a long history of timber harvesting?
Does the existence of other legislation created to protects bird
habitats support the argument that these later statues would
not be needed if the MBTA already protected bird habitats?
How can the court's holding in Mahler, that the MBTA was
not to be applied to "wide range of human activity [including
logging] that may incidentally and unintentionally cause the
death of migratory birds," be distinguished from the present
case?
Sample Questions on Review Under the APA
Does the Chrysler Supreme Court decision support reviewing
the Forest Service's actions for compliance with the MBTA?
Do the MBTA's prohibitions include federal agency actions
since the prohibitions are stated broadly, "it is unlawful" to
"kill," it is unlawful for any person"?
Must the MBTA apply to all federal agencies, including the
Forest Service, if the United States is to meet its obligations
under the 1916 treaty and subsequent amendments?
Distinguish or support the most recent tree harvesting case,
Sierra Club v. Martin, where the Eleventh Circuit held that
the MBTA, by its plain language, does not apply to the Forest
Service, and therefore, no violation of the MBTA could occur
by any formal action of the Forest Service.
Was the intent of the MBTA to subject the federal govern-
ment to its prohibitions?
19981 797
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Distinguish the Endangered Species Act in which Congress
defined "person" to include "any officer, employee, agency, de-
partment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government,"
from the MBTA which did not include the government in its
definition of "person."
Is there support for the argument that, even if the MBTA ap-
plied to the Forest Service, the agency has absolute discretion
to not to enforce the law?
In 1897, Congress established the National Forest System "to
conserve the water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply
of timber for the people." Would an interpretation that the
MBTA applies to the Forest Service ignore Congress' direc-
tive to manage the national forest for timber production?
Would an interpretation that the MBTA applies to the Forest
Service impair its ability to manage national forests for tim-
ber production?
Is there support for the argument that Congress intended for
the Forest Service to follow the NMFA's regulatory process,
rather than the MBTA's criminal prohibitions, in addressing
conservation of migratory birds?
Is the Forest Service's action arbitrary or capricious, or not in
accordance with law?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. IS THE POTENTIAL FOR BIRD DEATHS AN
INJURY THAT IS RIPE FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW AS WELL AS MEETING THE
STANDING REQUIREMENT OF A
PRESENT INJURY?
Under Supreme Court precedent, CSB must meet strin-
gent standing requirements. The Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the standing doctrine has been a swinging
pendulum: from strict to generous, to strict again. The swing
is clearly evinced in the three recent Supreme Court cases
starting with United States v. Students Challenging Regula-
tory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 727, 734 (1972), in
which the Court generously granted a group of Washington
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D.C. law students standing to challenge a rate increase the
Interstate Commerce Commission granted for train transpor-
tation of recycled materials The Court accepted that the stu-
dents would be injured by a rate increase that would
allegedly "cause increased use of non-recyclable goods, thus
resulting in the need to use more natural resources to pro-
duce such goods, . . .resulting in more refuse that might be
discarded [along hiking trails used by the students] in na-
tional parks in the Washington area.. ." Id. at 734. Today,
this type of indirect and remote injury would probably not
meet standing requirements. In 1990, the Supreme Court re-
stricted the limits of standing by narrowly construing the in-
jury-in-fact requirement. See Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990). In National Wildlife
Federation, plaintiffs challenged a Bureau of Land Manage-
ment program which reclassified federal lands opening cer-
tain land to the public. Id. at 871. Plaintiffs claimed that the
program violated the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act and NEPA. Id. The Court denied standing, finding that
that the group lacked a concrete injury; two plaintiffs af-
firming that their use of land "in the vicinity" of the federal
lands was not an injury sufficient to meet standing require-
ments. Id. at 891. The standing "hurdle" was further raised
in 1992, when the Supreme Court tightened the "injury-in-
fact" standing requirement, holding that an injury must be
"certainly impeding," and "concrete and particularized." See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). The
Court denied standing to a citizens group challenging the
Secretary of Interior's decision to limit the Endangered Spe-
cies Act (ESA), holding that a group member's intent to visit
the area in the future did not meet the "imminent" injury
standing requirement. Id. at 556. The Court also held that
plaintiffs did not have a redressible claim; it was uncertain if
the contested regulations even applied to agency. Id. at 568.
In order for CSB to gain access to the court, it must over-
come several standing hurdles. First, CSB must show that it
has an injury sufficient to meet standing, as required by the
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Second,
because the MBTA does not provide a private right of action,
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CSB must meet the standing requirements of § 702 of the
APA. In order for CSB to establish a right to relief under the
§ 702 of the APA, its challenge must be to a final agency ac-
tion and the injury caused by the action must be within the
"zone of interests" sought to be protected by the MBTA. In
addition to standing requirements, CSB must show that its
challenge is ripe for judicial review.
The argument that CSB has standing is discussed in Sec-
tion I.A. In summary, CSB has an injury that meets standing
requirements: its members use the forest to be harvested for
bird observation and clearcutting will cause direct and indi-
rect deaths of the many migratory birds that nest in the trees
planned for cutting, adversely affecting the activities of CSB
members. Direct deaths will result from harvesting trees
that contain nests with eggs or chicks. Indirect deaths will
result from the destruction of habitat caused by the loss of
mature forest. These injuries meet the injury-in-fact require-
ment for standing: they are concrete, particularized,
redressible, and fairly traceable to the actions of the Forest
Service. Finally, CSB's claim is ripe for review because both
the plan and sale are final agency actions and the Forest Ser-
vice will take no further action giving rise to review at a later
time.
The argument that CSB lacks standing is discussed in
Section I.B. In summary, CSB lacks standing because its in-
jury does not meet the "injury-in-fact" requirement: it lacks a
concrete, particularized, and imminent injury. Although the
timber sale has occurred, Blackacre has not engaged in any
tree harvesting activities and nothing requires it to do so in
the future. In addition to not meeting standing require-
ments, CSB's claim is also not ripe for review because Black-
acre has not harvested during nesting season and is not
about to do so, thus no specific injury action has yet
progressed to a sufficient point for meaningful judicial resolu-
tion of the issue.
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A. There is an Injury that Meets Standing and Ripeness
Requirements
1. The Timber Sale Causes an Injury-in-Fact
The doctrine of standing is based upon the United Stated
Constitution's limit on federal courts to adjudication of
"cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
Three requirements must be present for a plaintiff to meet
constitutional standing. First, plaintiff must have suffered
an "injury in fact," one that is "an invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-561, 578. Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the con-
duct complained of and the injury must be "fairly . .
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant . . .
Third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely "speculative,"
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id.
In addition to these constitutional standing require-
ments, a plaintiff may have to meet additional statutory
"standing" requirements. Since the NFMA does not provide a
private right of action, establishing the circumstances under
which a person can challenge agency action under the NFMA,
CSB's action is governed by section 10(a) of the APA which
provides "a person suffering a legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of the relevant statute, is entitled to judi-
cial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702. To establish a right to
relief under § 702 of the APA, CSB must establish that it has
been harmed by a final agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704.
Second, under the "zone of interest" test CSB must show that
its injury is within the "zone of interest" sought to be pro-
tected by the statutory provision at issue. See National Wild-
life Federation, 497 U.S. at 886.
CSB meets all standing requirements. First, the injury
is "concrete and particularized," not hypothetical: the timber
sale has occurred and even though the harvesting has not yet
occurred, it is "certainly impeding" and "imminent." See De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 555 (stating that assertions of
1998]
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potential future injury can satisfy the injury-in-fact test, as
long as the injury is actual or imminent). CSB's claim of in-
jury is "imminent," as the Environmental Impact Statement
states that " . . . if cutting occurs during spring or summer
months, it will undoubtedly result in the loss of nests with
their eggs of chicks.. . ." as well as particularized: "[a] total of
over one hundred nest containing one to three chicks each."
(R. 2). The contract has been finalized and harvesting will
definitely occur; therefore, there is no reason to postpone
litigation.
Second, the injury CSB complains of is directly caused
by, and can be traced to, the Forest Service's action. The For-
est Service has failed to protect migratory birds by not re-
stricting the contract terms to limit the season in which
clearcutting can occur. This failure allows Blackacre to har-
vest during nesting season, as it has already confirmed it will
do, because it does not believe it is violating the MBTA. (R.
2). The injury is directly caused by the Forest Service be-
cause it is the only agency granted the authority to control
this activity under the NFMA. Finally, CSB's injury is
redressible. To be redressible, the court must be able to offer
the plaintiff resolution to the injury suffered. Here, the court
can rescind the contract, or in the alternative, the court can
restrict Blackacre's tree harvesting activities not during nest-
ing season. Courts have held contracts that violate the
MBTA to be invalid. See Alaska Fish and Wildlife Federation
and Outdoor Council, Inc. v. United States Fish and Wildlife
Service, 829 F.2d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 988 (1988) (holding the agreement United States Fish
and Wildlife Service entered into allowing hunting of migra-
tory birds was violation of the MBTA and invalid).
Under similar circumstances, the Seventh and Ninth
Circuit have held that a challenge to national forest land use
plan is justiciable, even before the plan is implemented. In
Resources Limited, Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir.
1994), the Ninth Circuit held that land use plans play an im-
portant if not critical role in forest management and, to the
extent that they "predetermine the future, [they] represent a
concrete injury that plaintiffs must.., have standing to chal-
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lenge." (citing Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956
F.2d 1508, 1516 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit rejected
the argument that the two Supreme Court cases (National
Wildlife Federation and Defenders of Wildlife) established a
new, stricter burden on plaintiffs to establish with specificity
an injury-in-fact caused by a challenged government action.
Resources Limited, 35 at 1300 citing Portland Audubon Soci-
ety v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir.1993). Here, the
plan has been implemented and the contract has been final-
ized allowing tree harvesting; these are injuries that merit
standing for judicial review.
In a more recent decision, the Seventh Circuit held that
citizen plaintiffs have standing to challenge forest plans, stat-
ing that "[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of
threatened injury to obtain preventative relief." Sierra Club
v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 611-612 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593, affd, 263 U.S.
350 (1923)). In Sierra Club v. Marita, the court found plain-
tiffs met the injury requirements from affirmative evidence
showing that thousands of migratory birds would be directly
killed by cutting down the trees with nests and juvenile birds
in them. Id. at 609. Similarly, CSB has affirmative evidence
showing that bird deaths will occur and thus can meet stand-
ing requirements.
CSB should be granted standing to contest the contract
which allows migratory birds to be killed by tree harvesting.
In Alaska Fish and Wildlife Federation and Outdoor Council,
829 F.2d at 938, plaintiffs met all standing requirements to
contest cooperative agreements allowing Alaskan Natives to
hunt migratory birds under certain circumstances. The court
found that the plaintiffs had an injury which was traceable to
the actions of the government and there was substantial like-
lihood that the court could grant relief to address the injury.
Id. at 937.
2. CSB's Claim is Ripe for Review,
CSB must also show that its claim is sufficiently mature
to be considered a "controversy" as required by Article III of
the Constitution. U.S. Const. art III, section 2, cl. 1. In Ab-
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bott Laboratories v. Gardener, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967),
the Supreme Court explained the requirement of ripeness
prevents courts from "entangling themselves in abstract dis-
agreements over administrative policies, and also . . . pro-
tect[s] the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized." The Abbott
court explained that ripeness requires the court to balance (1)
the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hard-
ship of the parties of withholding court consideration. Id.
Under the Abbott decision's factors, CSB's challenge is
ripe for review. First, the issue is fit for judicial decision be-
cause the Forest Service has taken final action and will take
no further action giving rise to review at a later time. Sec-
ond, if judicial review is withheld, CSB will Suffer great hard-
ship for it will have no other opportunity to stop the bird
deaths that will result from clearcutting the forest pursuant
to the contract. Indeed, courts have held that plaintiffs "need
not wait to challenge a specific project when their grievance is
with an overall plan." See Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606,
614 (1995) (quoting Seattle Audubon, 998 F.2d at 703); see
also Portland Audubon Society, 998 F.2d at 708 (holding
challenge to timber management plan ripe for review, rather
than when individual sales are announced because, "to the
extent the timber management plans pre-determine the fu-
ture," and failure to comply with NEPA represents a concrete
injury which would undermine any future challenges by
plaintiffs.).
B. CSB Suffers No Injury and There is No Present
Dispute Before the Court
1. The Supreme Court Has Narrowly Defined Injury
to Meet Standing Requirements
CSB should be denied review of its claims because it can
not meet the Supreme Court's strict requirements of stand-
ing. In Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court tightened
the injury-in-fact requirement to require that the injury be
"imminent." 504 U.S. at 560. This decision highlights the
Supreme Court's recent trend to tighten standing require-
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/13
BENCH MEMORANDUM
ments and the fact that CSB will not be able to meet the in-
jury-in-fact requirement of standing. First, the injury is
entirely hypothetical. Even though there is a contract al-
lowing timber harvesting, Blackacre may or may not harvest
during nesting season. If Blackacre chooses to harvest dur-
ing seasons that birds are not nesting, there is no injury.
Further, CSB's claim of indirect deaths from habitat destruc-
tion due to tree harvesting is too remote and speculative to
meet the injury-in-fact standing requirement. CSB does not
have an injury that meets the Supreme Court's "certainly im-
pending" requirement. The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
have denied justiciability in similar situations, the former for
a lack of standing and the latter for a lack of ripeness. In
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994), the
Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the
Forest Service stating that forest plans are only management
tools; therefore, a plaintiff can suffer no injury-in-fact, hold-
ing that "[a]ssertions of potential future injury do not satisfy
the injury-in-fact test." Id. at 758.
Second, the injury CSB complains of is not directly
caused by, and can not be traced to, the Forest Service's ac-
tions. The line of causation between the conduct and the in-
jury is too attenuated. Plans are nothing more than broad
statements of intent and guidelines for management. See Si-
erra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d at 611 (forest land use plans are
broad conceptual plans without action and, in the absence of
action, no imminent injury can occur). CSB's claim of injury
is too remote and attenuated to be fairly traceable either to
the plan or to the contract for sale of timber land. The
Supreme Court requires more than just a plan, it requires an
injury that is actually occurring or "certainly impending" to
constitute an injury-in-fact. Even the contract for the timber
sale does not meet the "certainly impeding" requirement be-
cause the injury may or may not occur.
CSB will not be able to meet the "zone of interest" test.
In National Wildlife Federation, the Supreme Court stressed
that in considering claims brought under the APA, courts
must pay particular attention to what constitutes the "rele-
vant statute" for purposes of the "zone of interest" test. "The
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relevant statute ... is the statute whose violation is the gra-
vamen of the complaint." Here, the "zone of interest" is the
NMFA, which includes timber and wilderness usage. See 16
U.S.C. § 1604(e). The NMFA does not forbid the sale of tim-
ber or any other forest related activity because it will result
in the death of migratory birds. To the contrary, the NFMA's
purpose is to balance multiple uses of forest, including wild-
life and timber harvesting. See 16 U.S.C. § 528.
2. CSB's Claim is Not Ripe for Review
The Supreme Court requires that challenges to agency
actions be ripe, defining a ripe action as when "the scope of
the controversy has been reduced to more manageable pro-
portions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some con-
crete action . . ." National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at
891. In addition, when the action challenged is an agency ac-
tion, the APA allows judicial review only when there is a final
agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The contract to allow tim-
ber harvesting is not a final agency action because there is no
date for harvesting, nor there is any requirement to harvest.
In Wilderness Society v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 389 (11th Cir.
1996), the court held that plaintiffs challenge to a land use
management plan as violating NEPA was not ripe for judicial
review until a second stage of decision making occurred.
Here, no injury will occur until Blackacre makes a separate
and independent decision to harvest tress. Under the terms
of the contract with the Forest Service, only Blackacre can
make the final decision as to whether to harvest trees during
nesting season. If, and when, Blackacre makes this decision,
CSB's claim will be ripe for review.
II. IS THE MBTA'S MISDEMEANOR PROVISION A
STRICT LIABILITY CRIMINAL OFFENSE?
The question of whether the MBTA's misdemeanor provi-
sion is a strict liability offense arises because § 707(a), lacks a
mens rea requirement. The absence of a mens rea require-
ment seems to indicate that the provision is a strict liability
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offense, however, courts often interpret statutes silent on
mens reas to require scienter.
The arguments that the MBTA's misdemeanor provision
should be interpreted as a strict liability offense is discussed
in Section II.A. In summary, the argument for strict liability
is that Congress clearly intended the MBTA's misdemeanor
provision to be a strictly liable offense. When Congress added
a mens reas requirement to the MBTA's felony provision, it
chose not to add a mens rea requirement to the misdemeanor
provision. Courts interpret this legislative history as show-
ing that Congress knew the misdemeanor provision was a
strict liability provision and intended it to remain so. In ad-
dition, judicial precedent overwhelmingly interprets the mis-
demeanor provision as a strict liability provision.
The arguments that the MBTA's misdemeanor provision
should not be interpreted as a strict liability offense is dis-
cussed in Section II.B. In summary, interpreting the MBTA's
misdemeanor provision as a strict liability provision leads to
absurd results, troubling many courts and raising due pro-
cess concerns. The Supreme Court has increasingly inter-
preted strict liability criminal statutes to include mens rea,
thus avoiding the due process problem. In fact, all Supreme
Court opinions in the last twenty-five years have interpreted
strict liability criminal statutes to include a mens rea re-
quirement. The only statutes in which the Supreme Court
has interpreted silence on mens rea to mean congressional
intent for strict liability are public welfare statutes. The
Supreme Court, however, has narrowly defined public wel-
fare offenses to include only offenses that regulate the han-
dling of items of special danger to the public. The MBTA
clearly does not fall into this category; therefore, the Supreme
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A. The MBTA's Misdemeanor Provision is a Strict
Liability Offense
1. The Language of the Statute and the Legislative
History Supports this Interpretation
The MBTA provides that "unless and except as permitted
by regulations .. . it shall be unlawful at anytime, by any
means or in any manner, to... kill ... any migratory bird
." 16 U.S.C. § 703. The MBTA's misdemeanor penalty pro-
vision, § 707(a) contains no mens rea requirement:
... any person.. or corporation who shall violate any pro-
visions of said conventions of this subchapter... shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
thereof shall be fined not more than $500 or be imprisoned
not more than six months, or both.
16 U.S.C. § 707(a). Lacking any indication of mens rea, scien-
ter is not an element of criminal liability under the misde-
meanor section. This absence of mens rea implies that the
provision is a strict liability one. Courts, however, when
faced with a criminal statute silent on mens reas, will look to
the intent of Congress to determine whether it creates strict
liability. There is nothing in the legislative history of the
MBTA evincing that Congress intended a scienter require-
ment. Moreover, the Supreme Court has interpreted legisla-
tive silence on mens rea in several cases as evidence that
Congress did not intend to require mens rea. See e.g. United
States v. Balint, 252 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) ("[c]ongress
weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller
to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers
to danger from the [dangerous] drug, and concluded that the
latter was the result preferably to be avoided."); United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) ("[1]egislation dis-
pens [ing] with the conventional requirement for criminal con-
duct, awareness of some wrongdoing, will be upheld in
situations where it is in the interest of the larger good to
place the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise
innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public dan-
ger."); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (regu-
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latory measure lacking scienter requirement was upheld in
the interest of public safety).
Congress has shown that it intended the MBTA's misde-
meanor provision to embody strict liability by its 1986
amendment to section 707(b), the MBTA's felony provision.
This provision originally contained no scienter requirement,
but was amended to require scienter. Section 707(b) now
provides:
Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall knowingly-
(1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird
with intent to sell, offer to sell, barter or offer to barter
such bird, or (2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter,
any migratory bid shall be guilty of a felony and shall be
fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more that
two years, or both.
16 U.S.C. § 707(b). By this amendment, Congress clearly re-
quired mens rea for the felony provision but not for the mis-
demeanor provision. Congress knew the misdemeanor
provision was a strict liability provision and intended it to
remain as one. The 1986 Senate Report accompanying the
amendment states: "[n]othing in this amendment is intended
to alter the 'strict liability' standard for misdemeanor prose-
cutions under 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), a standard which has been
upheld in many Federal court decisions." Sen. Rep. No. 445,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1986).
Congress intended to affirm the numerous judicial deci-
sions that previously held the misdemeanor provision to be a
strict liability provision. In addition, Congress added a mens
rea requirement for the felony provision in response to a judi-
cial decision which reversed a conviction of MBTA felony on
the grounds that strict liability for felony violated due pro-
cess. See United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1124 (6th
Cir. 1985). The Wulff court, after reviewing Supreme Court
opinions, held that while strict liability violates due process
for felonies, it is acceptable for misdemeanor offenses. Id. at
1124.
The Wulff decision follows the general rule that strict lia-
bility offenses pass constitutional muster for misdemeanor
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provisions, but seldom for felony provisions. Misdemeanors
and felonies are treated differently by constitutional stan-
dards because of the differing severity of the sanctions and
the damage to reputation by conviction. See e.g. Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (sanctions strict liability
crimes where "penalties ... are relatively small, and convic-
tion does no grave danger to an offender's reputation."). By
their very nature, misdemeanor provisions,. with small penal-
ties, meet this constitutional requirement whereas felony
provisions do not. See e.g. United States v. St. Pierre, 578 F.
Supp. 1424, 1429 (W.D.S.D. 1983) ("There can be no question
but that a felony conviction irreparably damages a person's
reputation in this respect.").
2. Precedent Overwhelmingly Interprets the
Misdemeanor Provision as a Strict Liability
Provision
Since the inception of the MBTA in 1918, the overwhelm-
ingly majority of courts have interpreted misdemeanor hunt-
ing violations under the MBTA as a strict liability offense.
The courts have consistently held it is not necessary that the
government prove a defendant violated the MBTA's misde-
meanor provision with guilty knowledge or specific intent to
commit the violation. See United States v. Schultze, 28 F.
Supp. 234 (W.D.Ky. 1939) (convicting defendants "even
though there was not evidence of any guilty knowledge or in-
tent upon his part at the time of the commission of the of-
fense."); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943, 1001 (1967) (holding that "[ilt has
long been held that under the MBTA, it is not necessary that
the government prove that a defendant violated its provisions
with guilty knowledge or specific intent to commit the viola-
tion."); United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1983)
(scienter is not an element of offense under the MBTA).
Indeed, all Circuits considering the issue, except for the
Fifth Circuit, have held that the MBTA's misdemeanor provi-
sion is a strict liability offense. In United States v. Delahous-
saye, 573 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), the court required "a
reason to know," for conviction under the MBTA. Id. at 958.
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The court reasoned a minimum level of scienter was neces-
sary for conviction under the MBTA, stating that "[a]ny other
interpretation would simply render criminal conviction an
unavoidable occasional consequence of duck hunting and
deny the sport to those such, as, say judges who might find
such a consequence unacceptable. On the other hand to re-
quire a higher form of scienter, actual guilty knowledge,
would render the regulations very hard to enforce and would
remove all incentive for the hunter to clear the area, a pre-
caution which can reasonably be required." Id. However, the
Delahoussaye decision is a minority viewpoint; in fact, only
the Fifth Circuit holds this view.
Even in the transition from the traditional use of the
MBTA in hunting cases to protecting migratory birds from
other causes of death, the courts have held defendants to be
strictly liable for causing bird deaths. See United States v.
Corbin Farm Service, 444 F. Supp. 510 (D. Cal. 1978) (farmer
held to be strictly liable for unintentionally killing migratory
birds by spreading a toxic pesticide to his alfalfa field); United
States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (pesticide
manufacturer held to be strictly liable under MBTA for kill-
ing geese by inadvertently allowing a highly toxic pesticide to
escape from its manufacturing plant into its on-site pond).
But see United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 744 (D.
Idaho 1989) (MBTA's penalty provision unconstitutionally
vague as applied to a farmer inadvertently poisoning a flock
of geese by applying pesticides to his field, the MBTA "does
not state that poisoning ... migratory birds by pesticide con-
stitutes a criminal violation.").
Congress intended the MBTA's misdemeanor provision
to be a strictly liable offense as the MBTA's legislative history
indicates. Further, the courts have so interpreted Congress'
intent in numerous decisions, over several decades.
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B. The MBTA's Misdemeanor Provision is not a Strict
Liability Offense
1. Absurd Results Have Troubled Courts
Several courts have been troubled that meaningful limits
do not exist in applying the MBTA's strict liability provisions.
Courts pose examples of the absurd results that may occur in
literally applying this provision without a scienter require-
ment. In Mayer, the court questioned whether "a homeowner
who cuts down a dead tree, not knowing that it contains an
active nest of migratory birds, or perhaps just a single egg in
a nest invisible from the ground, commits a federal crime."
927 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Ind. 1996). The Second Circuit
warned "construction that would bring every killing within
the statute, such as deaths caused by automobiles, airplanes,
plate glass modern office buildings or picture windows in resi-
dential dwellings into which birds fly, would offend reason
and common sense." FMC, 572 F.2d at 905.
Several courts have "reluctantly" held defendants strictly
liable although troubled by the result. For example, in Cat-
lett, defendants were convicted for hunting migratory birds
on a baited field in violation of regulations promulgated
under the MBTA. See United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102
(6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1047 (1985). Regula-
tions promulgated under the MBTA, allow sport hunters to
shoot migratory birds under specified conditions, one of which
is that a hunter may not do so over a baited field. See 50
C.F.R. § 20.21 (a baited field is one that is spread with corn or
wheat to attract birds). The Catlett court was reluctant to
convict noting, "the unfortunate defendants were apparently
unaware of, and had not participated in, the baiting of the
field," and that, "[a] subjectively 'innocent' person can unwit-
tingly run afoul of the regulation." Nonetheless, the court
held that the MBTA "established that scienter is not required
for a conviction." Id; see also Brandt, 717 F.2d at 958 (the
court "reluctantly" convicted unknowing defendants, conced-
ing "that it is a harsh rule and trust that prosecution will
take place in the exercise of sound discretion only."). Mistak-
enly relying on the MBTA's status as a public welfare offense
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(as discussed in the next Section, the MBTA is not a public
welfare offense), the Catlett, court reasoned that all "'public
welfare' offenses in which scienter is not a requirement run
the risk of convicting innocent persons, but have been long
accepted by courts." 747 F.2d at 1104-1105.
The Rollins court refused to apply the MBTA's strict lia-
bility provision because it would "offend reason and common
sense." 706 F. Supp. at 742. The Rollins court held the
MBTA's penalty provision unconstitutionally vague as ap-
plied to a farmer who inadvertently poisoned a flock of geese
by applying pesticides to his field. Id. at 743. The court held
Rollins was not liable under the MBTA because he had used
due care in applying the pesticides, stating that the MBTA
"does not state that poisoning... migratory birds by pesticide
constitutes a criminal violation." Id. at 744. The Rollins
court refused to apply the MBTA to "trap a farmer who acted
in good faith" and noted its "queasiness" over the potential
reach of the MBTA's strict liability provision, concerned that
"a homeowner could be pursued under the MBTA if a flock of
geese crash in to his plate-glass window and were killed [or
that] an airplane pilot could be prosecuted if geese were
sucked into his jet engines." Id.
2. The Supreme Court Interprets Most Offenses to
Contain a Mens Rea Requirement
Under Supreme Court precedent, the MBTA's failure to
mention mens rea in its misdemeanor provision should not be
interpreted as creating a strict liability offense. Principles of
criminal law favor scienter requirements for criminal of-
fenses. Historically, mens reas, a "guilty mind," was an indis-
pensable element for every criminal violation. See Balint,
252 U.S. at 251. The "existence of mens rea is the rule of,
rather than the exception to the principles of Anglo-American
criminal jurisprudence" See United States v. United Stated
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978). Offenses that lack a
mens rea requirement are generally disfavored. See United
States v. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985). Precedent re-
quires the court to presume a mens rea requirement even
when statutory crimes derived from the common law are si-
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lent as to scienter. See Balint, 258 U.S. at 251-252. The
Court views offenses that are silent on mens rea as ambigu-
ous on the state of mind required for conviction, and following
the rule of lenity, will interpret them in favor of the defend-
ant to require mens rea See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263
("mere omission ... of intent [in the statute] will no be con-
strued as eliminating that element from the crimes de-
nounced."); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427 (requiring mens rea in
order to keeping with the longstanding recognition of the
principle of lenity).
The Supreme Court has indicated that due process sets
limits on the imposition of strict criminal liability. See Lam-
bert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (holding felony regis-
tration law violated due process when applied to a person
who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register). The
Supreme Court has increasingly interpreted statutes silent
on mens rea to include it, thus avoiding the inherent due pro-
cess problems that arise with strict liability offenses. This
trend is clear: all Supreme Court opinions in the last twenty-
five years have interpreted such statutes to include a mens
rea requirement. For example, the Supreme Court in
Liparota avoided due process problems by interpreting the
statute to require mens rea. 471 U.S. at 419. "Certainly far
more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase
from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispens-
ing with an intent requirement and that criminal offenses re-
quiring no mens rea have a generally disfavored status." Id.
(quoting Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 422). See also Morissette, 342
U.S. at 246 (holding that criminal intent is an essential ele-
ment of the crime of knowing conversion of government prop-
erty); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (holding
that the government is required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant knew weapon he possessed had charac-
teristics that brought it within regulation).
The Supreme Court has interpreted congressional si-
lence on mens rea as creating strict liability only for statutes
regulating potentially harmful or injurious items. These
statutes are commonly referred to as public welfare statutes.
The rationale for dispensing with mens rea in public welfare
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offenses is that the defendant knows that he is dealing with a
dangerous device which may harm the public; therefore, he
should be aware of the probability of strict regulation. Thus,
he is placed on notice that he must determine "at his peril"
whether is conduct comes within the statute's inhibition.
Clearly, the MBTA does not regulate this type of activity.
In Morissette, the Supreme Court explained that a differ-
ent standard applies to criminal statutes that are regulatory,
designed to protect the public welfare, and have no origin in
the common law. See 342 U.S. at 246. For those statutes,
commonly called "public welfare" statutes, intent is not al-
ways a necessary component. Id. The Supreme Court has ac-
cepted Congressional silence on mens rea as dispensing with
a scienter requirement for statutes regulating potentially
harmful or injurious items. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 609 (regu-
latory measure lacking scienter requirement was upheld in
the interest of public safety, "one would hardly be surprised
to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent
act"); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 277 ("[1legislation dispens[ing]
with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct,
awareness of some wrongdoing, will be upheld in situations
where it is in the interest of the larger good to place the bur-
den of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but
standing in responsible relation to a public danger."); Balint,
at 258 U.S. at 254 ("Congress weighed the possible injustice
of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of
exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the [dangerous]
drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably
to be avoided.").
The MBTA is not a public welfare offense statue and thus
would not be interpreted to lack a mens rea requirement.
Unlike Freed, Dotterweich, and Balint, all cases in which the
underlying statute regulate conduct that posed a threat to
public safety, the MBTA does not regulate this type of con-
duct. "The protection of migratory birds, albeit a legitimate
issue of public concern, can hardly be equated with the health
and safety concerns associated with hand-grenades and drug
distribution." United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 441 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987) (concurring
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opinion of Higginbotham). "A violation of the MBTA simply
does not fall into the category of felony offenses that the
Supreme Court has recognized as constitutional without
proof of scienter. The killing of a migratory birds is neither a
public welfare offense or is conduct that the average person
would realized was criminal." Id. at 441.
III. DOES THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
PROHIBIT THE KILLING OF MIGRATORY
BIRDS BY CLEARCUTTING FORESTS
DURING BIRD NESTING SEASON?
Depending upon whether the glass is half full or half
empty, the legislative history supports interpreting the
MBTA to prevent extinction of birds by protecting bird habi-
tats or simply as a bird hunting statute. The question for the
court to answer is whether the MBTA merely protects birds
from extinction from hunters or from extinction from any
cause. In answering this question, the statutory language,
amendments, legislative history, and case law under the
MBTA must be considered.
The arguments for interpreting the MBTA to prohibit
killings from tree harvesting are discussed in Section III.A.
In summary, the MBTA should be read more broadly than as
simply a "bird hunting statute." The legislative history in-
cludes the protection of migratory bird habitats as one of the
purposes to be accomplished by the MBTA. In addition, the
MBTA is the implementing statute for several international
treaties that have demonstrated a gradually expanding rec-
ognition of the importance of habitat protection for birds.
Since 1916, each amendment to the original treaty has in-
creasingly incorporated provisions to carry out this goal.
Further, the MBTA's broad language indicates the intent of
Congress to regulate all causes of bird deaths. Finally, the
recent acceptance by the courts of a broader use of the MBTA
supports the proposition that the MBTA is more than just a
"bird hunting statute," and is designed to prevent bird
deaths, regardless of the cause of death.
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The arguments for interpreting the MBTA not to prohibit
tree harvesting which may cause bird deaths is discussed in
Section III.B. In summary, the MBTA was intended only to
regulate the hunting of birds, not the cutting of timber or
other non-avian related economic activities that may indi-
rectly kill birds. This use of the MBTA would be a great ex-
pansion of the historical application of the MBTA. Several
courts when faced with expanding the MBTA beyond the ac-
tivity of hunting have held that the MBTA does not apply to a
"wide range of human activity [including logging] that may
incidentally and unintentionally cause the death of migratory
birds." See Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1576. The historical con-
text of the MBTA clearly indicates the intent of the MBTA: to
eliminate market hunting and to regulate recreational hunt-
ing, the two forms of human activity that were decimating
bird populations. Further, the historical interpretation and
application of the MBTA by the courts and the enforcement
officials of the Fish and Wildlife Service has been primarily a
hunting statute.
Finally, the MBTA has existed for over eighty years and
during this time logging activity has occurred continuously,
even during nesting seasons, resulting in the deaths of migra-
tory birds. It is incongruous that, for the first time in eighty
years, the MBTA be interpreted as prohibiting timber har-
vesting, an activity supported by Congress, as seen by the
passage of forest management legislation without regard to
bird deaths occasioned by a long history of timber harvesting.
A. The MBTA Prohibits Tree Harvesting Which May
Cause Bird Deaths
1. The Legislative History and Treaties Support the
Protection of Bird Habitats
The MBTA implements provisions of treaties between
the United States, Great Britain, Mexico, and Japan for the
protection of certain migratory birds. See The Convention be-
tween the United States and Great Britain for the Protection
of Migratory Birds in the United States and Canada, August
16, 1916, U.S.-U.K., 39 Stat. 1702; The Convention between
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the United States and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory
Birds and Game Mammals, February 7, 1936, U.S.-Mex., 50
Stat. 131; The Convention Between the United Sates of
America and the Government of Japan for the Protection of
Migratory Birds in Danger of Extinction, and their Environ-
ment, March 4, 1972, U.S.-Japan, 25 U.S.T. 3329, 3335; The
Convention Between the United Sates of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Conserva-
tion of Migratory Birds and their Environment, March 4,
1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 U.S.T. 4647, 4653-4654.
These treaties were enacted as a response to massive
numbers of bird deaths, including the extinction of certain
bird species. At the time of the MBTA's enactment the great-
est concern with bird protection was controlling recreational
hunting and eliminating market hunting, the predominant
activities impacting bird populations and raising concern for
bird extinction:
Not very many years ago vast numbers of waterfowl and
shore birds nested within the limits of the United States,
especially in the far West, but the extension of agriculture,
and particularly the draining on a large scale of swamps
and meadows, together with improved firearms and a vast
increase in the number of sportsmen, have so altered con-
ditions that comparatively few migratory game birds nest
within our limits
H.R. Rep. No. 65-243, at 2 (1918) (letter from Secretary of
State Robert Lansing to the President). Specifically, the
treaty sought to protect migratory birds which were ". . . in
danger of extermination through lack of adequate protection
during nesting season or while on their way to and from their
breeding grounds. . . ." Convention at 1702. Preventing un-
controlled hunting was a concern of all four treaties, however,
this concern for hunting should not be read as a limitation on
control of other activities that cause bird deaths.
The primary means of extinction at the time of enact-
ment of the MBTA was from hunting, but today the primary
means of bird extinction is through loss of habitat, a concern
mentioned in Lansing's letter in terms of the extent of agri-
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culture and the drainage of swamps. Clearly, the MBTA was
enacted to prevent bird extinction, regardless of the cause.
Congress showed great foresight by wording the MBTA with
language broad and flexible enough to accommodate unfore-
seen future developments. In Corbin, the court agreed that
Congress was concerned with hunting and capturing migra-
tory birds when it enacted the MBTA, however, the court
noted that this historical concern should not be interpreted as
a limitation on regulating other causes of bird deaths:
[t]he fact that Congress was primarily concerned with
hunting does not, however, indicate that hunting was its
sole concern. Paring the language of section 703 down to
its essentials, the section makes it illegal, at any time, by
any means or in any manner, to ... kill.. . any migratory
bird ... The use of the broad language 'by any means or in
any manner' belies the contention that Congress intended
to limit the imposition of criminal penalties to those who
hunted to captured migratory birds.... The legislative his-
tory of the Act reveals no intention to limit the Act so that
it would not apply to [other activities, such as] poisoning.
Id. at 532. The treaties seek to prevent species extinction,
regardless of cause. The 1916 Convention warned that mi-
gratory birds ". . . are in danger of extermination through
lack of adequate protection during the nesting season or
while on their way to and from their breeding grounds ......
H.R. Rep. No. 65-243 (1918).
The treaties demonstrate a gradually expanding recogni-
tion of the importance of habitat protection for birds. In
1972, the treaty with Japan expressly stated specific concerns
about the link between habitat and extinction, stating, "is-
land environments are particularly susceptible to distur-
bances... many species of birds of the Pacific [1Islands have
been exterminated, and ... some other species of birds are in
danger of extinction ...... U.S.-Japan Treaty, 25 U.S.T. at
3335. That treaty specifically requires each party to "en-
deavor to take appropriate measures to preserve and enhance
the environment" of protected birds and to "seek means to
prevent damage to such birds and their environment, includ-
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ing, especially, damage resulting from pollution of the
seas. .. ." Id. Finally, the 1972 treaty with the Soviet Union
states: "[tlo the extent possible, the Contracting Parties shall
undertake measures necessary to protect and enhance the
environment of migratory birds and to prevent and abate pol-
lution or detrimental alteration of that environment .... and
to identify areas of breeding, wintering, feeding, and moult-
ing which are of special importance to the conservation of mi-
gratory birds .... " U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, 29 U.S.T. at 4653-
4654.
Each time Congress approved a migratory bird treaty
and amended the MBTA to refer to it, Congress incorporated
the purposes of the new treaty into the MBTA. Congress'
amendments indicate that it intended to expand the MBTA's
prohibition to fulfill the purposes of the treaties. See Bob
Neufeld, Comment, The Migratory Treaty: Another Feather in
the Environmentalist's Cap, 19 S.D. L. Rev. 307 (1974) (argu-
ing that the treaty provisions are self-executing law). As the
focus of the treaties has grown from killing birds by hunting
to killing birds by habitat destruction, so too has the MBTA's
prohibition expanded.
Analyzing the evolution of the purposes of the treaties
which form the basis of the MBTA, it is quite possible that
the MBTA is entering new era of congressional intention to
protect birds from "any and all" environmental harms. While
Congress arguably may have intended the MBTA primarily
as a hunting regulation statute, in its recent amendments to
the MBTA, Congress intends that its broad language protect
birds from other harms, including habitat destruction. Fi-
nally, the recent acceptance by the courts of a broader use of
the MBTA supports the proposition that the MBTA is more
than just a "hunting statute." See e.g. FMC, 572 F.2d at 902
(pesticide manufacturer held to be strictly liable under
MBTA for killing geese by inadvertently allowing a highly
toxic pesticide to escape from its manufacturing plant into its
on-site pond); Corbin, 444 F. Supp. at 510 (farmer held to be
strictly liable for unintentionally killing migratory birds by
spreading a toxic pesticide to his alfalfa field); But see Mah-
ler, 927 F. Supp. at 1574 n.128 (holding that FMC and Corbin
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do not extend the language of the MBTA to habitat destruc-
tion that may lead indirectly to bird deaths.).
B. The MBTA Does Not Regulate Tree Harvesting
1. The MBTA is Only a Bird Hunting Statute
The MBTA was intended only to regulate the hunting of
birds, not the cutting of timber or other non-avian related
economic activity that may incidentally kill birds. See e.g.
Citizens Interested in Bull Run, Inc. v. Edrington, 781 F.
Supp. 1502, 1509 (D. Or. 1991) (stating that the fundamental
purpose of the MBTA was to protect migratory birds from ex-
tinction from bird hunters and to provide severe penalties for
market hunters who receive monetary benefit from the sale of
migratory bird parts.); Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1579
("[piroperly interpreted, the MBTA applies to activities that
are intended to harm birds or to exploit birds, such as hunt-
ing or trapping, and trafficking in birds and bird parts. The
MBTA does not apply to other activities that result in unin-
tended deaths of migratory birds."). Protecting bird habitats
would be a great expansion of the historical application of the
MBTA. Several courts when faced with expanding the MBTA
beyond the activity of hunting have held that the MBTA does
not apply to a "wide range of human activity [including log-
ging] that may incidentally and unintentionally cause the
death of migratory birds," Id. at 1576.
This historical interpretation and application of the
MBTA by the courts as well as the enforcement officials of the
Fish and Wildlife Service is dispositive of the fact that the
MBTA is primarily a bird hunting statute. The overwhelm-
ing number of MBTA convictions are of defendants for hunt-
ing birds. See e.g. Lansden v. Hart, 168 F.2d 409 (Ill. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 858 (holding the MBTA prohibits all
hunting of migratory birds except as permitted by regula-
tion); United States v. Boyton, 63 F.3d 337 (4th Cir, 1995)
(holding defendants strictly liable for hunting migratory
birds in baited field).
It is clear that the MBTA was intended only to regulate
bird hunting. The purpose of the treaty between the United
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States and Great Britain was to eliminate market hunting
and to regulate recreational hunting, the two forms of human
activity that were severely depleting bird populations. See
e.g. United States v. Lumpkin, 276 F. 580 (N.D.Ga.1921)
(stating that the Treaty of Aug. 16, 1916, with Great Britain
only regulates the hunting and killing of migratory birds and
does not cover other efforts to protect migratory birds.) Even
the most recent amendment to the MBTA in 1986, making it
a felony to knowingly engage in the selling of migratory bird
parts, is dispositive that the scope of the MBTA clearly re-
mains a "bird hunting statute."
Other legislation has been created to protect habitats.
See e.g. Bald and Golden Eagles Protection Act of 1940, 16
U.S.C. § 668 (protection of bald and golden eagles and their
habitats); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A
§ 1531-1544 (protection of endangered species including their
habitats); Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. ' 1131-1136 (es-
tablishing a National Wilderness Preservation System to be
composed of federally owned areas designated by Congress as
"wilderness areas"); Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act of
1980, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2912 (conservation of fish and wild-
life and their habitats); Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992,
16 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4916, 943 (protection of wild exotic birds
and their habitats). These statutes would be unneeded if the
MBTA already protected birds habitats.
2. Eighty Years of Concurrent Existences: National
Forest Management and the MBTA
The fact that the MBTA has existed for over eighty years
during which substantial timber logging activity has occurred
with congressional authorization. It is more than fair to as-
sume that timber harvesting has occurred during nesting
seasons and have resulted in the deaths of migratory birds.
Therefore, it is hard to imagine that for the first time in
eighty years the MBTA should be interpreted to prohibit tim-
ber harvesting.
Timber harvesting and the MBTA have concurrently ex-
isted for over eighty years. The first act granting authority to
the Forest Service to manage National Forests was the Or-
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ganic Administration Act of 1897. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551.
It provided authority for two simple purposes: to protect
"favorable... water flows" and "to furnish a continuous sup-
ply of timber." 30 Cong. Rec. 967 (1897); 16 U.S.C. § 475. Ac-
cepting these purposes, it is difficult to argue that just
nineteen years later Congress would enact the MBTA to pro-
hibit the Forest Service from furnishing a continuous supply
of timber because timber harvesting would kill migratory
birds or active nests "by any means or in any manner." See
Sierra Club v. Martin, 110. F.3d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1997).
This interpretation of the MBTA would severely impair the
Forest Service's ability to comply with Congress' directive to
manage the national forests for timber harvesting. Id.
The Organic Administration Act of 1897 was the sole au-
thority for regulating national forests for over sixty years. In
1960, in response to increasing demand for timber as well as
the need to utilize the national forests for other uses, Con-
gress passed the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960
(MUSYA) 16 U.S.C §§ 528-531. It added uses such as out-
door recreation and wildlife protection as purposes to be
served by national forests. See 16 U.C.S §§ 528-529. How-
ever, recreation, range, and "fish" purposes are "to be supple-
mental to, but not in derogogation of, the purposes for which
the national forests were established." United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 714 (1978) (quoting H. R. Rep. No.
1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1960)). As such, secondary pur-
poses cannot oust a primary purpose.
In 1976, a short time after enacting the MUSYA, the
NFMA was passed in response to the environmental aware-
ness that "the days have ended when the forest may be
viewed only as trees and trees viewed only as timber. The
soil and the water, the grasses and the shrubs, the fish and
the wildlife, and the beauty that is the forest must become
integral parts of resource managers' thinking and actions."
122 Cong. Record 5618-5619 (1976). The NFMA was also a
congressional response reversing the clearcutting ban set
forth in West Virginia Division of the Izaak Walton Legue of
America v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975), which held
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that the Organic Act prevented clearcutting as a timber har-
vesting method.
As indicated by the forest management legislation dis-
cussed above, it is clear that the purpose of federal forest
management evolved from the management of a single natu-
ral resource to the balanced management of multiple uses of
the national forests. The MBTA was never intended, as indi-
cated by its legislative history and applied case law, to exceed
the purpose of regulating bird hunting and to eliminating
market hunting. It would be a misapplication of the MBTA
and a usurpation of the Forest Service's authority under the
NMFA to conclude that the MBTA prevents tree harvesting
because birds or their habitats may be impacted by tree
harvesting.
When national forest legislation was first enacted, its
purposes were the provision of timber, not protection of birds.
The MBTA did not change the purpose of forest management
to the protection of birds. Congress, through the legislation
discussed above, repeatedly authorized timber harvesting
and sales after the enactment of the MBTA without the
slightest hint that it intended for national forests to be man-
aged to prevent bird deaths in the course of timber harvest-
ing. Even when Congress amended the forest management
laws to make protection of wildlife a purpose of forest man-
agement, it did not make it a primary purpose nor mandate
that forest harvesting kill no birds and wildlife. "[I]t would
stretch [the MBTA] far beyond the bounds of reason to con-
strue it as an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such
as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of
migratory birds." Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. United
States Forest Service, 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997).
Finally, the recent MBTA challenges to timber harvest-
ing have been rejected by the courts. In Sierra Club v.
United States Department of Agriculture, 116 F.3d 1482 (7th
Cir. 1997), plaintiffs objected to the Forest Service's plan
which determined the future use of the Shawnee National
Forest, alleging the plan violated the MBTA because it al-
lowed logging to occur during nesting periods which would
destroy bird habitats as well as directly kill migratory birds.
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The court held that MBTA does not protect modifications to
or degradation of a migratory birds habitat. Accord Seattle
Audubon Society, 952 F.2d at 302-303 ("there is strong evi-
dence that the MBTA does not include a prohibition of
habitat modification or degradation," holding that timber
management plans of United States Forest Service did not
violate the MBTA by allowing the logging of the habitat of the
northern spotted owl). In Mahler, the plaintiff argued that
although the MBTA does not prohibit indirect takings of
birds such as habitat destruction, it does prohibit direct tak-
ings by timber harvesting during nesting season where active
nests exists. The court held that neither type of "takings,"
direct or indirect, are prohibited by the MBTA and further, "a
'taking' under the MBTA did not include habitat modifica-
tion. 927 F. Supp at 1574; accord Citizens Interested in Bull
Run, 781 F. Supp. at 1504 (habitat modification is not within
the scope of the MBTA, "the Act was intended to apply to in-
dividual hunters and poachers."). Courts have rejected a
broad interpretation of MBTA. Further, the Forest Service's
consistent interpretation for eighty years of the MBTA should
not be overturned, especially when the result would have
such profound implications for timber harvesting throughout
the country.
IV. IS THE MBTA "LAW" WITH WHICH ACTIONS
UNDER NFMA MUST BE IN ACCORD FOR
PURPOSES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER
THE APA?
The APA sets forth the applicable scope of review for ad-
ministrative decisions, requiring a reviewing court to set
aside agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (emphasis added). An agency's actions can only
fail to be "in accordance with law" when the agency's actions
are subject to that law. The resulting question is whether the
Forest Service's actions are subject to the MBTA. If the For-
est Service's actions are, the Forest Service may have vio-




826 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
The arguments for interpreting the MBTA to apply to the
Forest Service is discussed in Section IV.A. In summary, the
MBTA should be interpreted to apply to actions taken by the
Forest Service because the Supreme Court's Chrysler decision
supports the argument that the MBTA is applicable "law" for
purposes of review under the APA. Second, the MBTA must
apply to all federal agencies, including the Forest Service, if
the United States is to meet its obligations under the 1916
treaty and subsequent amendments.
The arguments for not interpreting the MBTA to apply to
the Forest Service is discussed in Section IV.B. In summary,
the MBTA should not apply to actions taken by the Forest
Service because there is no right to sue for a violation of the
APA in the absence of a relevant statute whose violation
forms the legal basis for the complaint. Here, the MBTA is
not the relevant statute because the MBTA, by its plain lan-
guage does not apply to the federal government. Moreover,
jurisdiction to review the timber sale is conferred by the
NMFA, not the MBTA.
A. The MBTA is "Law" Which the Forest Service Must
Consider for Purposes of APA Review
1. The Supreme Court's Chrysler Decision is
Precedent for this Interpretation
Under precedent of Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, CSB can en-
force the MBTA through the APA, even notwithstanding the
fact that the MBTA is a criminal statute which creates no
private right of action. See 441 U.S. 281 (1979). Chrysler
sought to enjoin agency disclosure claiming the disclosure
was inconsistent with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
and the Trade Secrets Act, a criminal statute, that proscribes
disclosure of trade secrets of certain classes of business and
personal information. The Court found that FOIA is purely a
disclosure statute and afforded Chrysler no private right of
action to enjoin agency disclosure and that the Trade Secrets
Act, a criminal statute, also did not afford a private right of
action to enjoin disclosure in violation of the statute. Id. at
285. However, the Court could review the government's deci-
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sion to disclose trade secrets under the APA to determine if
disclosure is "authorized by law" within the meaning of the
Trade Secret Act. Id. The Court explained that section 10(a)
of the APA provides that "[a] person suffering a legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action, is entitled to review thereof." Chrysler
holds that any person adversely affected by an agency's viola-
tion of a criminal statute can obtain judicial review of that
agency's action under APA § 702. Id. at 318. Applying the
holding of Chrysler, the Forest Service's decision to allow tree
harvesting during nesting season should be reviewed under
the APA to determine if this action is "in accordance with
law." In reviewing this action, the court should find that it is
undisputed that contracts allowing timber harvesting during
nesting season will result directly in the death of migratory
birds; therefore, these actions constitute violations of the
MBTA and are "not in accordance with law."
Recent court decisions support that the MBTA applies to
the Forest Service. In Mahler, the court noted that "the
[APA] may be used by a party with standing to challenge gov-
ernment action that would violate that MBTA. This result is
correct because the APA permits challenges to agency action
that are contrary to law; it is reasonable because citizens can
reasonably expect that the government should abide by the
same laws imposed on private citizens." 927 F. Supp. at
1579. In Sierra Club v. USDA, the court found that the
MBTA applies to the Forest Service. The court remanded the
case to the lower court to determine whether the Forest Ser-
vice's Management Plan would violate the MBTA by allowing
logging, i.e., the killing of migratory birds, during nesting
season. Id.
Finally, the MBTA is law relevant to review under the
APA, despite being a criminal statute. Although the MBTA
is a criminal statue, it can be invoked in a civil context. The
Supreme Court has held that civil remedies may be appropri-
ate even where only criminal remedies are provided by a fed-
eral statute. See e.g. Wyndotte Transportation Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-202 (1967) (holding that the United
States could bring a civil action against corporate violators of
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the River and Harbors Act); United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491-492 (1960) (permitting the United
States to collect civil damages from violators of the Rivers
and Harbors Act.).
2. The MBTA Must Apply to Federal Agencies If the
United States is to Meet Its Obligations Under
the 1916 Treaty and Subsequent Amendments
The MBTA must apply to the Forest Service for the
United States to meet its obligations under the 1916 Treaty
as well as its subsequent amendments. Article VIII of the
Treaty states this commitment: "the High Contracting Pow-
ers agree themselves to take, or purpose to their respective
appropriate law-making bodies, the necessary measures for
insuring the execution of the present Convention." The Con-
vention at 1704.
The MBTA's prohibitions include federal agency actions
because the prohibitions are stated broadly, "it is unlawful"
to "kill," it is unlawful for any person." 16 U.S.C. § 707(a).
The government must comply with its own criminal laws.
The Department of the Interior (DOI), which administers the
MBTA, must interpret it to apply to apply to the government
and its employees, since DOI has promulgated regulations
exempting its personnel from the requirements of obtaining
MBTA permits for the taking of birds under limited circum-
stances. See 50 C.F.R § 21.12(a). This regulation would be
unnecessary if the MBTA did not apply to the government.
B. MBTA is not "Law" for Purposes of Review Under
the APA
1. There Is No Right To Sue For Violation of APA In
the Absence of Relevant Statutes Whose
Violation Forms the Legal Basis For
Complaint.
The MBTA is a criminal statute and does not address for-
mal agency action. Because the MBTA does not address
agency actions, agency actions are not statutory violations for
which an APA remedy would be appropriate. The APA sim-
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ply provides a framework for judicial review of agency action.
5 U.S.C. § 702. Section 702 provides that "[a] person suffer-
ing legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to review thereof." However, this
section itself does not confer jurisdiction to review agency ac-
tion. Therefore, "[tihere is no right to sue for a violation of
the APA in the absence of a 'relevant statute' whose violation
forms the legal basis for [the] complaint." National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. at 871. "The plaintiff must identify a
substantive statute or regulation that the agency action had
transgressed and establish that the statute or regulation ap-
plies to the United States." See Preferred Risk Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the Lanham Act does not apply to the federal
government; therefore, there is no basis for an APA
challenge)
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, EPA, 882 F.2d
at 1294, plaintiffs sued EPA to cancel its strychnine pesticide
registration, claiming these activities violated the MBTA.
The court held that the MBTA does not create a private right
of action. Id. at 1302. "Although the APA may state the
scope of review under 5 U.S.C. § 706, FIFRA [Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act] still provides the mecha-
nism for obtaining judicial review. Thus, the APA does not
operate separately from FIFRA, but instead as a part of
FIFRA." Id. at 1302-03. Holding that FIFRA was the proper
statute for judicial review, the court explained that "[wihen
Congress enacted the APA to provide a general authorization
for review of agency action in the district courts, it did not
intend that general grant of jurisdiction to duplicate the ...
established special statutory procedures relating to specific
agencies." Id. at 1302-03 (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487
U.S. 879 (1988)). Most recently, in Sierra Club v. Martin, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the MBTA, by its plain language,
does not apply to the Forest Service; therefore, no violation of
the MBTA could occur by any formal action of the Forest Ser-
vice. See 110 F.3d at 1555. "An agency's actions could only
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fail to be 'in accordance with law' when that agency's actions
are subject to that law." Id.
2. The MBTA, By Its Plain Language, Does Not Apply
to the Federal Government.
The MBTA is a criminal statute whose enforcement is
within the discretion of the Fish and Wildlife Commission.
Plaintiffs cannot collaterally enforce the terms of the MBTA
through the APA because the plain language of the MBTA
does not subject the federal government to its prohibitions.
See Newton, 113 F.3d at 115 (holding that the MBTA does not
apply to the actions of federal government agencies). The
MBTA is a criminal statute making it unlawful only for "per-
sons, associations, partnerships, and corporations" to "take"
or "kill" migratory birds. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a). Congress
did not intend to hold the federal government to regulation
under the MBTA as it did directly in the ESA in which Con-
gress defined "person" to include "any officer, employee,
agency, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Gov-
ernment." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13); see also Martin, 110 F.3d at
1556 (finding no expression of Congressional intent which
would warrant holding that a 'person' includes the federal
government). Congress has demonstrated that it knows how
to subject federal agencies to substantive requirements when
it chooses to do so. Moreover, even if the MBTA applied to
the Forest Service, the agency has absolute discretion to not
to enforce the law. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831
(1985) (holding that the decision whether to prosecute or en-
force a law has been assigned to an agency's absolute
discretion).
3. Jurisdiction To Review the Timber Sales Is
Conferred By the NMFA, Not the MBTA.
The historical context of the MBTA's enactment further
demonstrates that it does not apply to the Forest Service. In
1897, Congress established the National Forest System "to
conserve the water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply
of timber for the people.'" Cong. Rec. 967 (1897). It is un-
likely that Congress enacted the MBTA, barely twenty years
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later, to prohibit the Forest Service's already authorized log-
ging on federal lands which will inevitably result in the
deaths of individual birds and destruction of nests. An inter-
pretation that the MBTA applies to the Forest Service ig-
nores Congress' directive to manage the national forest for
timber production. See Seattle Audubon Society, 952 F.2d at
302 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the purpose of the MBTA is
to regulate the hunting, capture, possession, and sale of mi-
gratory birds, not to regulate logging activities). Moreover, to
interpret the MBTA to apply to the Forest Service would im-
pair its ability to manage national forests for timber produc-
tion. See Martin, 110 F.3d at 1556.
Congress' continued enactment of legislation relating to
management of the national forest system further supports
that the MBTA does not apply to the federal government.
National Forest planning is regulated by the NFMA, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 and its implementing regulations, 36
C.F.R., part 219 (1997). The purpose of the NMFA is for the
Forest Service to manage forests for multiple uses that in-
clude timber production. See 16 U.S.C § 528. In accordance
with NMFA, the Forest Service develops a Land and Re-
source Management Plan (LRMP) for each National Forest.
Through the NMFA, Congress prescribes the procedures the
Forest Service is to follow and the factors it is to consider in
making land management decisions, See 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
The proper review of actions challenging timber sales under
the APA is the Forest Service's compliance with viability reg-
ulations that require, in the context of multiple planning,
that a habitat be provided within the forest to support a mini-
mum number of reproductive individuals. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19.
Congress intended that the Forest Service follow the
NMFA's regulatory process, rather than the MBTA's criminal
prohibitions, in addressing conservation of migratory birds.
The Forest Service ensures the impact of land management
on migratory birds populations by ensuring the viability of
native species as directed by 36 C.F.R. § 219.19. The viability
regulation require, in the context of multiple use planning,
that habitats within the forest to support a minimum number
of reproductive individuals in order to "maintain viable popu-
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lations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate
species in the planning area." Id. The Forest Service's com-
pliance with the viability regulations is subject to judicial re-
view in actions challenging timber sales brought under the
NFMA. See e.g. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v.
United States Forest Service, 88 F.3d 754, 759-63 (9th Cir.
1996) (reviewing Forest Service's substantive duty under the
NFMA to provide for plant and animal communities in chal-
lenge to proposed timber sale in national forest).
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